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 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
Following a jury trial, Ms. Youmans was convicted of burglary, attempted burglary 
and misdemeanor possession of a controlled substance.  At sentencing, the district 
court imposed a unified sentence of ten years, with three years fixed, for the burglary, 
and five years, with three years fixed for the attempted burglary, and retained 
jurisdiction over Ms. Youmans.  Ms. Youmans was subsequently placed on probation 
for ten years.  On appeal, Ms. Youmans asserts:  (1) the district court abused its 
discretion by admitting the testimony of Officer Kip Paporello regarding the identification 
of the pills found on Ms. Youmans, due to the State’s failure to lay a proper foundation 
for the testimony; (2) the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 
Ms. Youmans possessed a controlled substance without a valid prescription; (3) the 
district court abused its discretion by imposing unified sentences of ten years with three 
years fixed and five years, with three years fixed, upon Ms. Youmans, for her 
convictions for burglary and attempted burglary; and (4) the district court was without 
jurisdiction to make any factual findings related to the prosecutorial misconduct alleged 
in the Notice of Appeal, after Ms. Youmans timely appealed to this Court. 
 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
 In August of 2013, Ms. Youmans was charged with burglary, attempted burglary, 
misdemeanor resisting and obstructing, and misdemeanor possession of a controlled 
substance.  (R., pp.59-60.)  The felony charges alleged that Ms. Youmans entered 
apartments at the Garden Plaza of Valley View with the intent to commit a theft inside.  
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(R., p.60.)  In April of 2014, the State filed an Amended Information, striking Count III, 
the misdemeanor charge for resisting and obstructing a police officer.  (R., pp.156-157.) 
Prior to trial, defense counsel filed a motion to compel “the State to produce a 
complete unedited copy of the surveillance video which it has offered and which it will 
rely on as part of its case in chief.”  (R., p.115.)  The State objected to Ms. Youmans 
motion to compel asserting that it has “made available to the Defendant, the entire 
surveillance videos from April and May 2013” and “[a]s of the writing of this response, 
counsel for the Defendant has not scheduled an appointment to view the video 
surveillance located at the Garden Plaza.”  (R., pp.125-128.)  At the April 8, 2014 
hearing on the motion to compel, the State indicated that it would make a copy of the 
surveillance video from December 2012 to May of 2013 and the attorney for 
Ms. Youmans indicated that would be sufficient.  (4/8/14 Tr., p.9, L.4 – p.11, L.22.)  At a 
hearing on May 5, 2014, defense counsel for Ms. Youmans made a motion to continue 
the jury trial, indicating that it was the intention of the defense to have its IT guy make a 
copy of the hard drive that contains the surveillance video of the Garden Plaza.  (4/8/14 
Tr., p.60, Ls.10-25.)   
Thereafter, the case proceeded to trial on September 9, 2014 and Ms. Youmans 
was ultimately found guilty on all three counts: burglary, attempted burglary, and 
misdemeanor possession of a controlled substance.  (R., pp.212-221, 259-261.)  The 
district court imposed a unified sentence of ten years, with three years fixed, for the 
burglary, and five years, with three years fixed for the attempted burglary, and retained 
jurisdiction over Ms. Youmans.  (R., pp.265-268.)  On December 15, 2014, 
Ms. Youmans filed a timely Notice of Appeal from the district’s Judgment of Conviction 
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and Sentence.  (R., pp.271-273.)  In the Notice of Appeal, defense counsel listed as one 
of four potential issues on appeal: “Did the State withhold the computer hard drive 
evidence and not allow defense counsel full access to it after multiple attempts?”  
(R., p.272.)  Thereafter, on April 27, 2015, the State Appellate Public Defender 
(“SAPD”) filed an Amended Notice of Appeal wherein it parroted the potential issues 
identified by trial counsel in the previously filed Notice of Appeal, including the issue 
related to the computer hard drive.  (R., pp.277-280.) 
At the April 27, 2015 rider reviewing hearing, the district court placed 
Ms. Youmans on probation for ten years.  (4/8/14 Tr., p.112, Ls.6-15.)  At the same 
hearing, requested another later hearing “clarify the underlying record [with regard to] all 
the efforts we did make to make that information available to – to show that that was a – 
it’s a baseless claim in the Notice of Appeal.”  (4/8/14 Tr., p.107, Ls.4-14.)  The district 
court noted:  “it’s an unusual request, and I’m not sure that I even have jurisdiction to 
consider it.”  (4/8/14 Tr., p.107, L.24 – p.108, L.1.)  The district court then issued its 
Order Suspending Sentence and Order of Probation.  (R., pp.283-288.) 
On June 19, 2015, the State filed a Memorandum in Response to Discovery 
Allegations and attached four exhibits, including an affidavits of Charles Faylor, Kip 
Paporello, and James Lordieri.  (R., pp.290-311.)  On July 7, 2015, the district court 
held a hearing at the State’s request on its previously filed memorandum.  (R., p.314.)  
At the hearing, the SAPD questioned whether the district court had jurisdiction to 
consider the State’s request to reopen the evidentiary portion of the case and argued 
that the “case law is pretty clear that [the district court] can’t supplement the record after 
the notice of appeal has been filed for further factual findings.”  (7/7/15 Tr., p.4, Ls.2-10, 
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p.5, Ls.4-8.)  The SAPD then filed an Objection to State’s Memorandum in Response to 
Discovery Allegations.  (R., pp.315-319.)  Following a second hearing, the district court 
concluded that it did have jurisdiction to make additional findings related to the 
underlying case after the notice of appeal had been filed and entered and Order 
Granting Motion to Supplement the Record.  (R., pp.335-342.) 
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ISSUES 
1. Did the district court abuse its discretion by admitting the testimony of Officer Kip 
Paporello regarding the identification of the pills found on Ms. Youmans, due to 
the State’s failure to lay a proper foundation for the testimony? 
 
2. Was there insufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 
Ms. Youmans possessed a controlled substance without a valid prescription? 
 
3. Did the district court abuse its discretion by imposing unified sentences of ten 
years, with three years fixed and five years, with two years fixed fixed, upon 
Ms. Youmans convictions for burglary and attempted burglary, to be served 
concurrently, in light of the mitigating factors present in the case? 
 
4. Was the district court without jurisdiction to make any factual findings related to 
the prosecutorial misconduct alleged in the Notice of Appeal after Ms. Youmans 
timely appealed to this Court? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Admitting The Testimony Of Officer Kip 
Paporello Regarding The Identification Of The Pills Found On Ms. Youmans, Due To 
The State’s Failure To Lay A Proper Foundation For The Testimony 
 
 
A. Introduction 
 
 Ms. Youmans was charged with misdemeanor possession of a controlled 
substance wherein the State alleged she possessed 17 Hydrocodone pills.  Rather than 
submit the sized pills to the laboratory for testing, the State offered the testimony of 
Officer Paporello who used an unknown online resource to identify the pills as 
Hydrocodone.  Ms. Youmans’ foundational objection to the admission of Officer 
Paporello’s testimony was overruled.   
 
B. The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Admitting The Testimony Of Officer 
Kip Paporello Regarding The Identification Of The Pills Found On Ms. Youmans, 
Due To The State’s Failure To Lay A Proper Foundation For The Testimony 
 
 
1. The State Failed To Meet The Foundational Requirements For Officer 
Paporello’s Testimony Regarding Identification Of The Pills Found In 
Ms. Youmans’ Purse 
 
Ms. Youmans was charged with misdemeanor possession of a controlled 
substance wherein the State alleged that Ms. Youmans committed the offense by 
being in the possession of Hydrocodone, a Schedule III controlled substance.  
(R., pp.57-58.)  The charges stem from Ms. Youmans’ arrest on a warrant in July of 
2013.  (Tr., p.433, L.18 – p.437, L.7.)1  During an inventory search of Ms. Youmans’ 
                                            
1 There are six separately bound transcripts on appeal.  For ease of reference, the 
bound transcript containing Ms. Youmans’ entry of plea, motion to suppress, jury trial 
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purse at the jail, 17 loose pills were found in her purse along with a prescription bottle 
in her name.  (Tr., p.437, L.23 – p.438, L.24.)  At trial, Officer Paporello was asked if he 
was able to identify what type of pill was found in her purse and defense counsel for 
Ms. Youmans made an objection for insufficient foundation.  (Tr., p.440, Ls.5-9.)  The 
district then permitted the State to provide more foundation.  (Tr., p.440, Ls.9-13.)  
Officer Paporello testified that he attempted to identify the pill by searching on the 
internet.  He stated:  
what you can do with the application is, you can put in the numbers that 
are listed on the pill and anything on either side, you can put that in.  It’ll 
ask you the shape of the pill, and the color, and some of the applications 
do vary a little bit on the information they request. 
 
 But then, it will provide you, based on the inscriptions on the pill, 
what the pill is.  Even pill has its own type of – every type of medication 
has its own identifiers.   
 
(Tr., p.441, L.22 – p.442, L.8.)  Officer Paporelli then testified that the use of an internet 
search to identify a pill was something he knew based on his “training and experience 
as a law enforcement officer.”  (Tr., p.442, Ls.9-12.)  Officer Paporelli also testified that 
it was common for other officers to use online resources.  (Tr., p.443, Ls.2-11.) 
 Thereafter, the State again asked the officer as to what he identified the pill as, 
and defense counsel again objected, “Judge, I don’t believe that she’s laid enough 
foundation to have Officer Paporello explain what kind of pill it is.  He’s not a 
pharmacist.”  (Tr., p.443, Ls.17-19.)  The State responded, “my response is that through 
Detective Paporello the State has laid foundation.  The identification of a prescription pill 
is overly scientific, where an – an expert would be needed to do that.  He’s looking at 
                                                                                                                                            
and sentencing hearing is cited herein as “Tr., p., L..”  The remaining bounds transcripts 
will be cited with reference to the date of the first hearing contained within the transcript. 
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information in an online database that’s commonly used by law enforcement to identify 
prescription pills.”  (Tr., p.444, Ls.3-9.)  The district court then sustained the objection, 
finding that the State had failed to show whether law enforcement officers routinely rely 
on this information from an online website.  (Tr., p.444, Ls.10-16.)  Officer Paporello first 
acknowledged that he did not recall the name of the internet website he used to reach 
the conclusion as to the identity of the pill.  (Tr., p.444, Ls.22-25.)  The officer then 
affirmed that he had previous discussions with “Officer Buzzini about his work with the 
DEA and also prescription pills,” but is “not a narcotics officer” and does not work pills 
cases very often.  (Tr., p.446, Ls.17-21, p.447, Ls.20-25.)  Officer Paporello did testify 
that officers commonly use internet websites to identify prescription pills in the field.  
(Tr., p.446, Ls.11-15.)   
 Defense counsel for Ms. Youmans continued to object.  (Tr., p.448, Ls.12-13.)  
The State then argued: 
Your Honor, through the testimony of Detective Paporello, he’s testified 
that the resource they use, though unidentified, is one that he relies on, 
and that in his work with other law enforcement officers . . . Your Honor 
heard testimony that he’s primarily assigned to property crimes.  But other 
law enforcement officers, that do do their work in regard to specifically 
prescription pills and their work with the DEA, that they also use online . . .  
rely on online resources to identify prescription pills. 
 
(Tr., p.448, Ls.16-25 (emphasis added).)  Following the State’s argument, the district 
court overruled Ms. Youmans’ objection.  (Tr., p.449, Ls.1-2.)  Thereafter, Officer 
Paporello testified that the pills found in Ms. Youmans’ purse were “identified as 
Hydroocdone” and was of the strength “5-325 milligram.”  (Tr., p.449, Ls.10-15.) 
The district court abused its discretion by overruling defense counsel’s objection 
and allowing Officer Paporello to identify the purported nature of the pills found in 
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Ms. Youmans’ purse.  The trial court has broad discretion in determining the 
admissibility of testimonial evidence.  State v. Smith, 117 Idaho 225, 232, 786 P.2d 
1127, 1134 (1990).  A decision to admit or deny such evidence will not be disturbed on 
appeal absent a showing of abuse of that discretion.  Id.  First, it is important to note 
that there is nothing in the record to support the premise that Officer Paporello was 
identified as a prescription pill expert, or expert of any kind, as required by Idaho 
Criminal Rule (“I.C.R.”) 16(b)(7).  (R., pp.22-31, 144-146 (Ms. Youmans’ discovery 
requests).)  Moreover, even if the State had complied with the mandatory requirements 
of I.C.R. 16(b)(7) and disclosed Officer Paporello as an expert for purposes 
identification of prescription pills, Officer Paporello would not have met the threshold 
requires to testify as an expert witness as he freely admitted he was not a narcotics 
officer and rarely handled prescription pill cases.  (Tr., p.446, Ls.17-21, p.447, Ls.20-
25.)   
Ms. Youmans acknowledges that “publication by experts should be admitted in 
evidence to prove the truth of the matter stated therein if . . . a witness expert in the 
subject testifies . . . that the treatise, periodical, or pamphlet is a reliable authority on the 
subject.”  State v. Crabb, 107 Idaho 298, 306 (Ct. App. 1984) (quoting Heilman v. 
Snyder, 520 S.W.2d 321, 323 (Ky. Ct. App. 1975)).  Thus, even if the State had 
provided the required notice and Officer Paporello was qualified to offer an opinion as 
the nature of the pills found in the purse, the State failed to specifically identify the 
treatise upon which he was relying.  Thus, the only testimony before the district court 
was that Officer Paporello did a Google search, found an unknown website, and relied 
on the hearsay statement on the website to purportedly identify the pills found in 
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Ms. Youmans’ purse to be Hydrocodone of the strength “5-325 milligram.”  (Tr., p.449, 
Ls.10-15.) 
As such, the State failed to meet its obligations to provide an adequate 
foundation for Officer Paporello’s testimony and the district court abused its discretion in 
permitting the jury to hear the inadmissible evidence. 
 
2. The Error Was Not Harmless Beyond A Reasonable Doubt 
“A defendant appealing from an objected-to, non-constitutionally-based error 
shall have the duty to establish that such an error occurred, at which point the State 
shall have the burden of demonstrating that the error is harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt.”  State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 222 (2010).  The United States Supreme Court 
made it clear that proper harmless error review looks “to the basis on which ‘the jury 
actually rested its verdict.’”  Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279 (1993) (quoting 
Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391, 404 (1991) (emphasis from Sullivan).  As such, the United 
States Supreme Court concluded, “[t]he inquiry, in other words, is not whether in a trial 
that occurred without the error, a guilty verdict would surely have been rendered.”  Id.   
Here, the error certainly affected the jury’s verdict as to the charge of 
misdemeanor possession of a controlled substance.  The only evidence that the State 
offered to prove that the pills found in Ms. Youmans purse were a controlled substance 
was Officer Paporello’s testimony.  As such, there was a reasonable possibility the error 
contributed to the verdict and as such the State cannot prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt, that the error was harmless.  See Perry, 150 Idaho at 226.   
Likewise, there was a reasonable possibility the error contributed to 
Ms. Youmans’ verdict of guilty on both felony offenses.  There is no evidence in this 
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case that anyone observed Ms. Youmans, who previously worked at Garden Plaza and 
still had friends residing in the live center, enter any apartment and take anything.  
Rather, the State’s case was built entirely on circumstantial evidence based on videos 
of Ms. Youmans visiting the Garden Plaza after her employment had ended.  However, 
crucial to the State’s case, was the State’s theory the pills found in Ms. Youmans’ 
possession at the time of her arrest were Hydrocodone, the same type of pills 
purportedly missing from a room of one of the Garden Plaza’s residents.  (See 
Tr., p.437, L.21 – p.448, L.6, p.449, Ls.10-15, p.453, Ls.453, Ls.15-21.)  In fact, the 
State highlighted this during its closing argument: 
You had testimony from Detective Paporello that she had 17 loose 
Hydrocodones in her purse, that they were the . . . 5-325 is what I believe 
Detective Paporello testified to, the same that were missing from 
Clarence’s room.  Detective Paporello told you that they were not in a 
prescription bottle. 
 
(Tr., p.706, Ls.2-8 (emphasis added).)  Thus, it cannot be said, beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the district court’s error in allowing Officer Paporello to identify the mystery 
pills found in Ms. Youmans’ possession did not contribute to her convictions for burglary 
and attempted burglary. 
 Accordingly, Ms. Youmans’ convictions for burglary, attempted burglary, and 
misdemeanor possession of a controlled substance should all be vacated. 
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II. 
 
There Is Insufficient Evidence To Prove Beyond A Reasonable Doubt That 
Ms. Youmans Possessed Hydrocodone 
 
 
A. Introduction 
 
The only evidence offered at trial to prove that Ms. Youmans possessed 
Hydrocodone in violation of I.C. 37-2732(c) was Officer Paporello’s testimony that 
based upon an internet search, he identified the pills found in Ms. Youmans’ purse as 
being Hydrocodone.  The State failed to offer sufficient foundation to admit Officer 
Paporellos testimony and as a matter of law, the reliance on hearsay statements from 
an unknown internet website that a purported pill is Hydrocodone does not prove the 
issue beyond a reasonable doubt.  As such, Ms. Youmans’ conviction for misdemeanor 
possession of a controlled substance should be vacated. 
 
B. There Is Insufficient Evidence To Prove Beyond A Reasonable Doubt That 
Ms. Youmans Possessed Hydrocodone 
 
Ms. Youmans asserts that there was insufficient evidence to convict her of 
misdemeanor possession of a controlled substance.  Specifically, the State failed to 
offer sufficient evidence that the pills found in Ms. Youmans’ purse were hydrocodone, a 
controlled substance.   
An accused’s right to demand proof of the State’s case beyond a reasonable 
doubt is of “surpassing importance.”  Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 476 
(2000).  The right to demand proof beyond all reasonable doubt is a bedrock 
constitutional principle.  See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (“Although virtually 
unanimous adherence to the reasonable-doubt standard in common-law jurisdictions 
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may not conclusively establish it is as a requirement of due process, such adherence 
does ‘reflect a profound judgment about the way in which law should be enforced and 
justice administered.’” (quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155 (1968)).  
“Simply stated, the fact that defendant is ‘probably’ guilty does not equate with guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt.”  People v. Ehlert, 811 N.E.2d 620, 631 (Ill. 2004). 
In State v. Crawford, 130 Idaho 592 (Ct. App. 1997), it was stated that: 
[a]ppellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence is limited in scope.  A 
judgment of conviction, entered upon a jury verdict, will not be overturned 
on appeal where there is substantial evidence upon which a reasonable 
trier of fact could have found that the prosecution sustained its burden of 
proving the essential elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt . . . 
[w]e will not substitute our view for that of the jury as to the credibility of 
the witnesses, the weight to be given to the testimony, and the reasonable 
inferences to be drawn from the evidence . . . [m]oreover, we will consider 
the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. 
 
Id. at 594-595 (citations omitted). 
In State v. Mitchell, 130 Idaho 134 (Ct. App. 1997), it was noted that, “[e]vidence 
is regarded as substantial if a reasonable trier of fact would accept it and rely upon it in 
determining whether a disputed point of fact has been proved.”  Id. at 135, 937 P.2d at 
961.  “The challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is not based on a technical or 
subtle defect. The defense simply says that there was not enough admissible evidence 
to convict the defendant.”  State v. Faught, 127 Idaho 873, 877 (Ct. App. 1995). 
Here, for the reasons set forth above in section I(B), because the district court 
improperly permitted Officer Paporello to testify that the pills found in Ms. Youmans’ 
purse were Hydrocodone, and the only evidence that the State offered to prove that the 
pills found in Ms. Youmans purse were a controlled substance was Officer Paporello’s 
testimony, the State failed to prove all the essential elements of misdemeanor 
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possession of a controlled substance beyond a reasonable doubt.  As such, 
Ms. Youmans’ conviction for that offense should be vacated. 
Assuming arguendo, that this Court does conclude that the district court did not 
abuse its discretion in admitting the testimony, the State has still failed to prove beyond 
a reasonable doubt that the pills found in Ms. Youmans’ purse were a controlled 
substance.  As the State candidly conceded during trial, “The identification of a 
prescription pill is overly scientific, where an – an expert would be needed to do that.”  
(Tr., p.444, Ls.3-9.)  There is no evidence in the record that the pills were ever tested by 
the State to determine their scientific makeup and the jury certainly did not hear any 
such evidence.  As such, as the State conceded, it cannot meet its rigorous burden to 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the substance possessed by Ms. Youmans was 
in fact a controlled substance based upon an unqualified officer’s testimony on what he 
“learned” via an internet search in an area that he is unfamiliar with.  Accordingly, 
Ms. Youmans’ conviction for misdemeanor possession of a controlled substance should 
be vacated. 
 
III. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed A Unified Sentence Of Ten 
Years, With Three Years Fixed, And A Sentence Of Five Years, With Three Years 
Fixed, Upon Ms. Youmans’ Convictions For Burglary And Attempted Burglary, 
Respectively 
 
A. Introduction 
 
Ms. Youmans was convicted of burglary, attempted burglary, and misdemeanor 
possession of a controlled substance.  The district court imposed a unified sentence of 
ten years, with three years fixed, for the burglary, and five years, with three years fixed, 
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for the attempted burglary, and retained jurisdiction over Ms. Youmans.2  Ms. Youmans 
was subsequently placed on probation for ten years. Ms. Youmans asserts that the 
district court abused its discretion by failing to withhold judgment over her, or in the 
alternative, imposed excessive sentences upon her in light of the mitigating factors 
present in her case.  
 
B. The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed A Unified Sentence Of 
Ten Years, With Three Years Fixed, And A Sentence Of Five Years, With Three 
Years Fixed, Upon Ms. Youmans’ Convictions For Burglary And Attempted 
Burglary, Respectively 
 
“It is well-established that ‘[w]here a sentence is within statutory limits, an 
appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the court 
imposing the sentence.’” State v. Pierce, 150 Idaho 1, 5 (2010) (quoting State v. 
Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) (alteration in original)). Here, Ms. Ruiz’s sentence 
does not exceed the statutory maximum. See I.C. § 18-3604 (maximum of fourteen 
years). Accordingly, to show that the sentence imposed was unreasonable, 
Ms. Youmans “must show that the sentence, in light of the governing criteria, is 
excessive under any reasonable view of the facts.”  State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460 
(2002).  
“‘Reasonableness’ of a sentence implies that a term of confinement should be 
tailored to the purpose for which the sentence is imposed.”  State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 
445, 483 (2012) (quoting State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148 (2008)). 
In examining the reasonableness of a sentence, the Court conducts an 
independent review of the entire record available to the trial court at 
sentencing, focusing on the objectives of criminal punishment: (1) 
                                            
2 On appeal, Ms. Youmans does not challenge her sentence for misdemeanor 
possession of a controlled substance. 
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protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public; (3) 
possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for 
wrongdoing. 
 
Stevens, 146 Idaho at 148. “A sentence is reasonable if it appears necessary to 
accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of the 
related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution.”  State v. Delling, 152 Idaho 
122, 132 (2011).  
Ms. Youmans asserts that the district court abused its discretion by failing to 
withhold judgment in both of her felony cases, or in the alternative, by imposing 
excessive sentences upon her in light of the mitigating circumstances present in her 
case.  At the time the jury verdict in her case, then 49 year old Ms. Youmans had not 
previously been charged with, or convicted of a felony offense.  (Presentence 
Investigation Report (“PSI”), pp.3, 6-7.);3 see State v. Hoskins, 131 Idaho 670, 673 
(1998); State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89 (1982).  The defendant in Hoskins pled guilty to two 
counts of drawing a check without funds.  Hoskins, 131 Idaho at 673.  In Nice, the 
defendant pled guilty to the charge of lewd and lascivious conduct with a minor.  Nice, 
103 Idaho at 90.  In both Hoskins and Nice, the court considered, among other 
important factors, that the defendants had no prior felony convictions.  Hoskins, 131 
Idaho at 673; Nice, 103 Idaho at 90.  Furthermore, the Nice Court found the defendant’s 
honorable discharge from the military to be a factor in mitigation of sentence.  Id. at 90.  
The Hoskins Court ultimately found that based upon the nature of the offense and the 
                                            
3 The PSI is contained in the electronic record “Youmans 42795 psi” and is cited herein 
as “PSI.” 
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absence of any prior serious criminal record, the district court abused its discretion in 
imposing the sentence.  Hoskins, 131 Idaho at 675. 
Furthermore, Ms. Youmans’ prior convictions consist entirely of misdemeanor 
offenses and are directly related to her admitted addiction issues, which, in part, likely 
resulted from past injures and her fibromyalgia.  (PSI, pp.6-7, 12.)  Following her 
conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol in 2003, Ms. Youmans indicated that 
she now only consumes a “couple glasses” of wine on special occasions.  (PSI, p.12.)  
Ms. Youmans indicated that although she was not initially aware of her problems with 
prescription medications, Ms. Youmans now understands that she does have an 
addiction to certain pain medications and has expressed the desire to “explore natural 
remedies for her pain” upon her release from incarceration.  (PSI, p.10; Tr., p.773, 
Ls.18-21.)  Evidencing her intent to break the cycle of addiction, Ms. Youmans inquired 
into a number of outpatient programs and expressed the desire to complete 90 
meetings in 90 days in Narcotics Anonymous.  (Tr., p.775, Ls.8-22, p.777, Ls.15-20.)  
In addition to her lack of prior felony history and understanding of the addiction 
issues she has and is facing, Ms. Youmans has the support system in place to meet her 
goals of continued sobriety.  As defense counsel noted, Ms. Youmans’ friends and 
family were present at sentencing to show their support.  (Tr., p.768, Ls.23-25.)  In her 
PSI, Ms. Youmans wrote that she’s still happily married and that her husband supports 
her.  (PSI, p.9.)  Ms. Youmans also has a great relationship with her four children.  (PSI, 
p.9.)  In addition, Reverend David Wells wrote that Ms. Youmans has a “caring, 
structured family that goes to great lengths over great distances to support one 
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another.”  (PSI, p.1.)  Lee Axelsen, President of Axelsen Concrete Construction, wrote 
that Ms. Youmans “is an extremely caring wife, mother, and grandmother.”  (PSI, p.4.) 
Accordingly, in light of the foregoing, Ms. Youmans asserts that the district court 
abused its discretion by failing to withhold judgment in both of her felony cases, or in the 
alternative, by imposing excessive sentences upon her. 
 
IV. 
The District Court Was Without Jurisdiction To Make Any Factual Findings Related To 
The Prosecutorial Misconduct Alleged In The Notice Of Appeal After Ms. Youmans 
Timely Appealed To This Court 
 
A. Introduction 
Following the filing of a timely Notice of Appeal and after the district court held a 
rider hearing and placed Ms. Youmans’ on probation, the State filed a memorandum 
seeking to supplement the record related to a potential claim of prosecutorial 
misconduct identified by Ms. Youmans’ trial attorney in the Notice of Appeal.  
Ms. Youmans’ objected to the district court’s jurisdiction consider any additional 
evidence or to make any additional factual findings related to potential the claim of 
misconduct.  The district court concluded it did have jurisdiction, considered additional 
evidence submitted in the form of affidavit, and supplemented the underlying record in 
the instant appeal.  Ms. Youmans contends the district court lacked jurisdiction. 
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B. The District Court Was Without Jurisdiction To Make Any Factual Findings 
Related To The Prosecutorial Misconduct Alleged In The Notice Of Appeal After 
Ms. Youmans Timely Appealed To This Court 
On September 11, 2014 Ms. Youmans was convicted of burglary, attempted 
burglary, and misdemeanor possession of a controlled substance and sentenced for the 
same on November 10, 2014.  (R., pp.259-261, 264-268.)  On December 15, 2014, 
Ms. Youmans filed a timely Notice of Appeal from the district’s Judgment of Conviction 
and Sentence, identifying as a potential issue on appeal:  “Did the State withhold the 
computer hard drive evidence and not allow defense counsel full access to it after 
multiple attempts?”  (R., pp.271-273.)   
At the April 27, 2015 rider reviewing hearing, the district court placed 
Ms. Youmans on probation for ten years.  (4/8/14 Tr., p.112, Ls.6-15.)  On April 28, 
2015 the district court entered its Order Suspending Sentence and Order of Probation.  
(R., pp.283-288.)  On June 19, 2015, the State filed a Memorandum in Response to 
Discovery Allegations and attached four exhibits, including an affidavits of Charles 
Faylor, Kip Paporello, and James Lordieri.  (R., pp.290-311.)  At a hearing on the 
State’s memorandum and in a subsequent objection, the SAPD questioned whether the 
district court had jurisdiction to consider the State’s request to reopen the evidentiary 
portion of the case and argued that the “case law is pretty clear that [the district court] 
can’t supplement the record after the notice of appeal has been filed for further factual 
findings.”  (7/7/15 Tr., p.4, Ls.2-10, p.5, Ls.4-8; R., pp.315-319.)  The district court 
concluded that it did have jurisdiction to make additional findings related to the 
underlying case after the notice of appeal had been filed and entered and Order 
Granting Motion to Supplement the Record.  (R., pp.335-342.) 
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 Ms. Youmans asserts that the district court was without jurisdiction to 
supplement the record with additional facts and findings following the filing of a timely 
Notice of Appeal.  Once an appeal was perfected the trial court lost all jurisdiction of the 
cause and could not allow amendments or enter a substituted or supplemental order. 
See Dolbeer v. Harten, 91 Idaho 141, 147-48 (1966) (relying upon I.C. § 13-208 which 
stated that all further proceedings in a lower court are stayed during the pendency of an 
appeal (statute repealed in 1977)); see also Syth v. Parke, 121 Idaho 156 (1990) (“For 
nearly a century, this Court has followed the general rule that once an appeal is 
perfected the trial court is divested of jurisdiction of the cause.”  Id. at 157-58).  
However, the adoption of the Idaho Appellate Rules (I.A.R.) in 1977 altered that 
tradition.  Idaho Appellate Rule 13 maintained that proceedings in the lower court were 
stayed during the pendency of an appeal, but granted the trial courts limited jurisdiction 
to address specific motions and issues. See I.A.R. 13; see also Syth, 121 Idaho at 158 
(recognizing that I.A.R. 13 replaced I.C. § 13-208, retained general rule of stay, but 
granted limited jurisdiction); Hells Canyon Excursions, Inc. v. Oakes, 111 Idaho 123 
(Ct. App. 1986) (recognizing that the adoption of the court rules granted limited 
jurisdiction). Once a notice of appeal is timely filed from a judgment of conviction, a 
“district court then lacks authority to enter orders in the case, except as to certain 
matters enumerated in [Idaho Appellate] Rule 13(c).”  State v. Wade, 125 Idaho 522, 
524 (Ct. App. 1994).  
 Whether a discovery violation occurred in the instant case depend upon the 
district court’s rulings, counsel’s arguments, and the record created at the trial court 
level before the Notice of Appeal was filed. Rather than relying upon the record created 
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prior to the filing of the Notice of Appeal, the district court has allowed the State to 
supplement the record and court rulings in order to address what it believed would be 
an issue raised on appeal.4  However, “[a] trial court may not reconsider or make post 
hoc rationalizations of previous rulings once a notice of appeal is filed.”  Wade, 125 
Idaho at 524.  This is, perhaps, why there is no rule or statute which authorizes the 
State to supplement the evidence or seek additional findings after a notice of appeal 
has been filed. Cf. State v. Wilson, 138 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 2001) (finding that I.A.R. 
13(c)(10) allows a trial court to rule on motions “authorized by law,” such as a motion 
authorized to be filed by court rule).  
 Accordingly, because the district court was without jurisdiction to consider 
additional evidence and supplement the record this case, this Court should strike form 
the record all of the State’s legal filings related to this issue from the date of 
Ms. Youmans’ December 15, 2014 Notice of Appeal and all evidence offered and 
findings made by the district court should not be considered by any court in any future 
proceedings related to this case. 
                                            
4 It should be noted that Ms. Youmans has not raised on appeal the question of whether 
the State withheld the computer hard drive evidence and denied defense counsel 
access to the same.  This of course raises the question of whether the Ada County 
Prosecutor’s Office has any standing, or a cognizable legal interest, to now be a party in 
the instant appeal.  The SAPD acknowledges that filed a Notice of Non-Objection to the 
Ada County Prosecutor’s Office’s initial participation in the instant appeal. 
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CONCLUSION 
 Ms. Youmans respectfully requests that this Court vacate her convictions for 
burglary, attempted burglary, and misdemeanor possession of a controlled substance.  
Alternatively, Ms. Youmans requests that this Court vacate her sentences and remand 
the case to the district court with instructions that it withhold judgment over her.  
Alternatively, Ms. Youmans requests that this Court reduce her sentences as it deems 
appropriate.  Additionally, Ms. Youmans requests that this Court strike all filing by the 
State, any additional evidence offered, and all findings by the district court related to 
the potential claim that the State withheld the computer hard drive in this case and/or 
denied her defense counsel access to the same. 
 DATED this 8th day of March, 2016. 
 
      __________/s/_______________ 
      ERIC D. FREDERICKSEN 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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